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Abstract
In Slovakia, the privatization of the state property in the beginning of the 1990s created a 
need for the corporate governance implementation. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate 
the level of implementation of corporate governance in Slovakia after more than 25 years 
since starting the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, including a 
legal framework for its implementation. To support our analysis, we explored a rela-
tionship between the level of the corporate governance implementation and economic 
results of corporations. For this purpose, we reviewed annual reports for year 2015 by 27 
corporations listed on the Bratislava Stock Exchange. The average profit of the evaluated 
corporations was approaching 21 million EUR, and the average assets value was at 1.2 
billion EUR. Using the scoring method devised by us for this purpose, the average score 
of the annual report evaluation reached 2.59 points out of maximum 5 points. Finally, 
we tested a hypothesis that improving the level of corporate governance implementation 
may contribute to profitability and assets value of corporations.
Keywords: corporate governance, principles, implementation, transition, privatization
1. Introduction
In the academic literature as well as at the regulatory level, there are various definitions of 
the corporate governance. A governance in general is dealing with strategy development for 
directing a group of people and deciding on roles of its members [1]. According to the OECD, 
corporate governance involves a set of relationships among company’s management, its board, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides a structure through 
which objectives of company are set, and means of attaining those objectives and performance 
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monitoring are determined. The purpose of corporate governance is to help build an environ-
ment of trust, transparency, and accountability necessary for fostering long-term investment, 
financial stability, and business integrity [2]. Corporate governance deals with the way sup-
pliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment [3]. 
Corporate governance system is a combination of mechanisms which ensure that the manage-
ment (the agent) runs the firm for the benefit of one or several stakeholders (principals). Such 
stakeholders may cover shareholders, creditors, suppliers, clients, employees, and other par-
ties with whom the firm conducts its business [4]. Corporate governance represents the whole 
set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what public corporations 
can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and return from 
the activities they undertake are allocated [5]. Knapik explains that it is an internal structure 
of rules governing the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the actors inside the 
corporation as well as outside of it. Corporate governance increases the market value of a cor-
poration and the benefits for its shareholders [6]. In our opinion, corporate governance can 
be defined as a control system for transactions of a specific nature, namely for contractual 
relations arising between corporate capital owners and corporate managers in result of invest-
ing into corporate capital. Property owners are seeking a profitable allocation for their avail-
able resources, where managers are possessing professional competences. A contract arises 
between the capital owners and corporate managers that can be broken by one or both parties 
under imperfect competition conditions. In order to ensure desirable performance under these 
contracts, a concept of corporate governance has been devised [7].
It is a prerequisite for the corporate governance implementation that some corporate capital 
exists. The first joint stock companies emerged in the seventeenth century. However, by the 
mid of the nineteenth century, companies were mostly directed and controlled by their own-
ers. In 1855, the Limited Liability Act was adopted in the United Kingdom that introduced 
the concept of limited liability of the shareholders. This resulted in increasing profitability of 
companies. Management as a profession emerged and the capital ownership was detached 
from the company management [8]. These matters are the source of essential problems in the 
current corporate governance.
After the regime change in Slovakia, the transition and namely privatization of the state prop-
erty in the beginning of the 1990s created a need for the corporate governance implementa-
tion. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the level of implementing corporate governance 
in Slovakia after more than 25 years since starting the transition from a centrally planned to 
a market economy, including a legal framework for its implementation, as well as to explore 
an expected relationship between the level of the corporate governance implementation and 
economic results of corporations.
2. Economic transition and privatization in Slovakia
Economic transition from the centrally planned to a market economy at the beginning of 1990s 
started by one-shot price liberalization, followed by further rapid liberalization steps includ-
ing abandoning of wage regulation, introduction of internal convertibility of the currency, 
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privatization, liberalization of foreign trade (for more details see for example [9–11]), and, in 
later stages, building of market institutions [12]. The privatization in Slovakia took the form 
of restitution, the large-scale privatization, and the small-scale privatization. In January 1991, 
the Bratislava Stock Exchange was founded. The large-scale privatization took place in two 
phases: the first one in years 1991–1993 and the second one in years 1993–1996. The first phase 
of the so-called coupon or voucher privatization started with preparing the list of privatized 
companies. Slovak citizens were granted coupon books with 100 investment points in return 
for 1000 Kčs (Czechoslovak crown, currency unit in the former Czechoslovakia). Citizens 
investors were able to purchase directly company stocks or vest their investment points in so-
called investment privatization funds (IPFs). As they were lacking any knowledge on invest-
ing, IPFs were preferred. These funds obtained 6.1 billion investment points representing 71% 
out of the total number [13].
In Slovakia, a method of rapid transformation, so-called “shock therapy,” was applied. It was 
believed that a rapid transformation of property rights would automatically lead to the creation 
of market regulation mechanism and law enforcement. This method combined the property 
rights reform with the creation of the financial market of Anglo-Saxon model. At the same time, 
the German model of universal banks, i.e., the combination of credit and investment banking 
(concentrated model of corporate governance) was adopted. However, the absence of regulation 
authorities turned to be a problem in the privatization and in the financial market creation. For 
example, minority shareholders were not always sufficiently protected [14]. The transformation 
should have started with effective regulation and law enforcement, not with privatization.
3. National corporate governance code
The first national code of best practises for corporate governance was published by the com-
mittee chaired by A. Cadbury in 1992 in the UK. In 1999, the OECD published the corporate 
governance principles. The principles were revised in 2004 and 2015.
“The Principles themselves are evolutionary in nature and are reviewed in light of significant changes 
in circumstances in order to maintain their role as leading instrument for policy making in the area of 
corporate governance” [2].
The latest review is a response to the international financial and economic crises as well as 
to challenges of the global economy. The principles are nonbinding, they seek to identify 
objectives and suggest various means for achieving them. The above document contains six 
main principles each of which is supplemented by number of supporting sub-principles. The 
principles are presented in six chapters. In the following text, we indicate only a very brief 
description of the principles. Due to the large number of changes, we emphasize the most 
important ones marking them as “new.”
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework (transparent and fair 
markets, efficient allocation of resources, clearly defined split of powers among authori-
ties, new: independency and accountability of supervision, regulatory, and enforcement 
authorities).
Economic Transition and the Corporate Governance Implementation
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70533
57
II. The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions 
(shareholdersʼ rights such as the right to secure methods of ownership registration, con-
vey or transfer shares, obtain information on the corporation, participate and vote in 
the general shareholder meetings, elect and remote members of the board, share in the 
profits; equitable treatment of shareholders; disclosure of capital structure and control 
arrangements, new: making use of information and communication technologies at gen-
eral meetings such as electronic voting and vote confirmation systems, ability to vote in 
person or in absentia, disclosure of remuneration of board members and key executives).
III. Institutional investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries as a new principle replac-
ing the previous third principle requiring equal treatment of shareholders (institutional 
investors acting in a fiduciary capacity, conflicts of interests minimization concerning 
analysts, brokers or rating agencies, fair and efficient price discovery at stock markets).
IV. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance (active cooperation between corpora-
tions and stakeholders, especially creditors, bank and insurance companies; the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or by contractual relations; access to information on a 
timely and regular basis for stakeholders; effective redress for violation of rights).
V. Disclosure and transparency (disclosure on financial and operating results of a compa-
ny, on company objectives, share ownership, remuneration, related party transactions, 
foreseeable risk factors, responsibilities of the CEO and/or Chair, new: nonfinancial 
reporting).
VI. The responsibilities of the board (functions of the board such as guiding corporate strat-
egy, major plans of action, annual budges etc.; selecting, compensating, or replacing key 
executives, ensuring the integrity of accounting and financial reporting systems, new: 
responsibility of the board for oversight of the risk management system, tax planning, 
and internal audit).
Among the most significant changes of the OECD principles in its latest revision, there is 
the introduction of enforceability together with sanctions in case of incompliance with the 
principles. Such sanctions by government authorities are included in the first chapter that 
describes corporate governance framework, transparency, fairness, and effective allocation of 
resources. In this chapter, new references are also made to the accountability of supervising 
bodies, respecting human rights, environment protection, as well as to the need for a cross-
border cooperation and information exchange among government authorities in different 
countries in the case of cross-border ownership. As far as the structure of principles is con-
cerned, the third principle—formerly titled “The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders”—has 
been fundamentally changed. In the new revision, the third chapter aims at discouraging the 
conflict of interests that may concern analysts, brokers, rating agencies, or other persons. The 
next important change relates to the obligation to disclose not only financial but also nonfi-
nancial information. Company websites serve as the best medium for this purpose. In our 
opinion, another significant change is the responsibility of the board for overseeing the risk 
management system, tax planning, and internal audit.
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The OECD principles may be adopted not only by corporations listed on stock markets but 
also by other companies, including smaller enterprises. For them, adopting and implement-
ing corporate governance principles may improve their reputation, their position in supplier-
customer relations, as well as their access to external financial resources.
The OECD principles have become a basis for creating national codes of good corporate gov-
ernance in many developed countries. According to the OECD, there is no single model for a 
good corporate governance [2]. The adjustment to local legal, economic, and cultural condi-
tions is therefore necessary. While the EU member states prefer nonbinding corporate gov-
ernance principles, in the U.S. mandatory rules prevail. Following the year 2000, corporate 
scandals in the U.S. were revealed such as accounting fraud in Enron and WorldCom. They 
led to enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 defining responsibilities of corporation's board 
of directors and introducing criminal penalties for certain misconducts.
The creation of the national corporate governance code for Slovakia reflects very closely the 
development concerning corporate governance in the rest of the world. Already, the first 
Slovak code published in 2002 referred back to the OEDC 1999 principles. This code was incor-
porated into the Bratislava Stock Exchange rules for shares admission to the listed market. In 
2004, the Bratislava Stock Exchange initiated establishing an association that would monitor 
international developments in the field of corporate governance, update the national code, 
and promote the implementation of principals by corporations. Foundation of the Central 
European Corporate Governance Association (CECGA) in 2004 was an important step from 
the institutional point of view. Following the publication of revised OEDC Principles in 2004 
as well as the changes of the relevant legislation in Slovakia1, the CECGA in cooperation with 
other institutions such as the National Bank of Slovakia, the Slovak Banking Association, the 
Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic, 
and the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic elaborated the new corporate governance 
code for Slovakia, setting benchmarks to internal company relationships and environmental 
matters. It came into effect in 2008 and was applicable to all companies whose securities were 
admitted to trading on the Bratislava Stock Exchange regulated market [15]. The code was 
structured according to the OECD principles; however, the principle of ensuring the basis for 
an efficient corporate governance framework was emphasized as an underlining principle of 
the code.
The approval of G20/OECD principals' revision in 2015 represents the next milestone of the 
Slovak national code development. The second Slovak code revision was coordinated by 
a Steering Committee that met for the first time in February 2016, comprising representa-
tives of five institutions (CECGA, the Bratislava Stock Exchange, the Ministry of Economy 
of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, and the University 
1This legislation encompasses mainly: Act No. 460/1992 – Constitution of the Slovak Republic; Act No. 513/1991 – Com-
mercial Code; Act No. 40/1964 – Civil Code; Act No. 365/2004 Z. z. – Act on Equal Treatment in Particular Areas and 
on Protection against Discrimination; Act No. 300/2005 – Criminal Code, Act No. 540/2007 Coll. on Auditors, Audit and 
Audit Supervision; Act No. 483/2001 Coll. on Banks; Stock Exchange Act No. 429/2002 Coll.; Act No. 566/2001Coll. on 
Securities and Investment Services; Act No. 7/2005 Coll. on Bankruptcy and Restructuring; Act No. 431/2002 Coll. on 
Accounting; Act No. 311/2001 – Labor Code.
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of Economics in Bratislava). A tutor responsible for review was appointed to each of the six 
chapters of the code: they were:
• the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic as a tutor for both the ensuring the basis 
for an effective corporate governance framework (chapter 1) and the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance (chapter 4),
• the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic as a tutor for both the rights and equitable 
treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions (chapter 2) as well as the responsi-
bilities of the board (chapter 6),
• the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic as a tutor for both the institutional investors, 
stock markets, and other intermediaries (chapter 3) as well as the disclosure and transpar-
ency (chapter 5).
The remaining members of the Steering Committee gave recommendations on the draft. 
Further consultation with specialists and representatives of companies aimed at simplification 
and readability of the text. Repeatedly revised code was introduced to the public in October 
2016 during the 19th European Corporate Governance Conference. Apart from the OECD 
2015 Principles, the revised code incorporates also the EU Commission Recommendations on 
the quality of corporate governance reporting on the “comply or explain” basis (2014/208/EU), 
on the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (2009/385/EC), on the role 
of nonexecutive directors of listed companies and on the committees of the board (2005/162/
EC) as well as the recommendation fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of 
directors of listed companies (2004/913/EC). In the field of transparency and information dis-
closure, the relevant EU legal framework is regarded by incorporating the binding Directive 
2013/34/EU and nonbinding Commission Recommendation 2014/208/EU. The Directive 
2013/34/EU on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements, and related 
reports of certain types of undertakings refers to the corporate governance in recital 4:
“Annual financial statements pursue various objectives and do not merely provide information for 
investors in capital markets but also give an account of past transactions and enhance corporate gover-
nance. Union accounting legislation needs to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of the 
addressees of financial statements and the interest of undertakings in not being unduly burdened with 
reporting requirements” [16].
Undertakings referred to in the directive (i.e., public-interest entities such as undertakings, 
whose transferable securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, credit institu-
tions, and insurance undertakings) shall include a corporate governance statement in their 
management report. That statement shall under Art. 20 (1)(a) contains a reference to the:
• corporate governance code to which the undertaking is subject,
• the corporate governance code which the undertaking may have voluntarily decided to 
apply,
• all relevant information about the corporate governance practices applied over and above 
the requirements of national law.
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If an undertaking departs from a corporate governance code, Art. 20 (1)(b) of the direc-
tive requires an explanation as to which parts of the corporate governance code it departs 
from and the reasons for doing so. Where an undertaking decides not to refer to any provi-
sions of a corporate governance code, it shall explain reasons for not doing so. Furthermore, 
the corporate governance statement shall include a description of the main features of the 
undertaking's internal control and risk management systems as well as the composition and 
operation of the administrative, management, and supervisory bodies and their committees. 
Article 20 (1)(b) of the directive refers to the key principle of corporate governance in the EU, 
namely the “comply or explain” principle that explained in more detail in the Commission 
Recommendation 2014/208/EU. The aim of this recommendation is to provide guidance for 
member states and their companies on corporate governance reporting.
“It is recommended that, where applicable, corporate governance codes make a clear distinction between 
the parts of the code which cannot be derogated from, the parts which apply on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis and those which apply on a purely voluntary basis” [17].
Companies should describe how they have applied corporate governance code in order to 
inform shareholders, investors, and other stakeholders. The information should be easily 
accessible and available on companies' websites.
Article 20 (1)(b) of the Directive 2013/34/EU requires listed companies to provide explana-
tions in case of departure from the recommendations of the code to which they are subject 
to or which they have voluntarily decided to apply. The explanation of departure from an 
individual corporate governance code recommendation should specify:
• in what manner a company departed from a recommendation,
• the reasons for the departure,
• how the decision to depart from the recommendation was taken within the company,
• where the departure is limited in time, when the company envisages complying with a 
particular recommendation,
• where applicable, a measure taken instead of compliance and how that measure achieves 
the underlying objective of the specific recommendation or of the code as a whole, or how 
it contributes to the good corporate governance of the company.
The corporate governance code for Slovakia implements the “comply or explain” approach. 
Therefore, it was necessary to clearly differentiate the principles that are regulated by laws 
in Slovakia from the rest of the text. The code is intended not only for listed companies but 
also for other companies interested in its implementation. The code regulates internal as well 
as external relationships of companies on basis of fairness, openness, and accountability. 
Disclosure, within the limits given by the position of a company among competitors, is a 
basis for trust between a company and those, who contribute to its success such as sharehold-
ers, employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, or other stakeholders [18]. Companies should 
comply with the code since January 1, 2017, and report according to the code since 2018.
Economic Transition and the Corporate Governance Implementation
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70533
61
Apart from the code, an important corporate governance regulation in Slovakia is represented 
by the Act No. 431/2002 Coll. on Accounting as well as Act No. 540/2007 Coll. on Auditors, 
Audit, and Audit Supervision. The Act on Accounting in its § 20 imposes an obligation to 
corporation listed on regulated markets to support their annual reports with a statement on 
corporate governance. The annual report should further include an information on the capital 
structure, rights attached to all series and classes of shares, restrictions of voting rights, share-
holders with special rights including the description of these rights, rules for appointing and 
withdrawing board members, and powers of the board, particularly the right to decide on 
issuing or buying back shares and so on.
4. Evaluation of the corporate governance implementation and its impact 
on economic results of corporations
Regular evaluation of the corporate governance implementation in Slovakia is carried out by 
the CECGA based on publicly available information, primarily on the quality of the annual 
reports of corporations. Surveys on corporate government disclosure for the years 2011–2014 
are available to the public. The association monitors the quality of information on corporate 
governance, the compliance with the § 20 of the Law No. 431/2002 on Accounting as well 
as with the corporate governance code for Slovakia. In 2014, the survey covered 66 compa-
nies listed and traded on the Bratislava Stock Exchange. Companies with capital listed in the 
multilateral trading system were excluded from the survey because according to the Stock 
Exchange Act No. 429/2002, the disclosure obligation does not apply to them. The evaluation 
criteria included [18, 19]:
• Presence of disclosed annual report in the Central Register of Regulated Information 
(CERI), in the Register of Financial Statements (RUZ) and on the company's website (ac-
cording to § 34 of the Stock Exchange Act, companies are required to publish an annual fi-
nancial report including the annual report as well as information on corporate governance 
no later than 4 months after the end of the financial year).
• Availability of information on the company's website (in accordance with § 23d of the Ac-
counting Act as well as with the principle IV of the code).
• Scope and quality of information in the corporate governance statement (according to the 
Accounting Act, the annual report of a company has to include a statement on corporate 
governance).
• Information about board members of the company including their qualifications, selection 
process, and independence (this obligation is imposed by § 20, paragraph 6 of the Account-
ing Act as well as by the principle IV of the code).
• Disclosure on remuneration of directors and the supervisory board according to the prin-
ciple IV of the code.
• Information on risk management as recommended by the principle IV of the code.
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• Information on the existence, composition and activities of the Audit Committee (compa-
nies whose securities are trade on a regulated market are required to establish an audit 
committee according to § 19 of the Accounting Act; this committee does not have to be set 
up separately if the supervisory board carries out its normal activities).
• Information on the existence, composition, and operation of the Remuneration Com-
mittee (according to principle V of the code, the establishment of this committee is 
recommended).
• Information on the existence, composition, and activities of the Nomination Committee 
(similarly, the establishment of the nomination committee is recommended by principle V 
of the code).
• Additional criteria such as information on rotation of auditor, board members elected by 
employees, independent board members, and gender diversity.
The survey results show positive changes compared to previous year in several areas. The 
number of companies disclosing their annual report in all of the available platforms (e.g., 
CERI, RUZ, and on the company's website) increased from 1 in 2013 to 39 in 2014. Annual 
report or annual financial report was quickly and easily available on website for 76% of 
companies. The share of companies without available corporate governance statement or 
with a statement providing no relevant information fell from 60 to 42%. However, the share 
of companies with comprehensive explanation of each item, and deviation from the code 
decreased slightly from 22 to 20%. As far as disclosure of information on board members is 
concerned, the decrease by three percentage points to 13% in the share of companies that 
do not provide any information can be observed. However, this percentage is still very 
high. The disclosure on remuneration is an area that most companies (71%) have carefully 
protected. The share of companies providing sufficient information about risk management, 
ex-ante risk, and risk quantification slightly increased, making 23% in total. Finally, a grow-
ing number of companies that inform on the establishment of the Audit Committee were 
observed.
For our research, we, however, performed our own review of annual reports for year 2015 by 
27 corporations listed on the Bratislava Stock Exchange. We selected corporations that met 
two criteria: they had been listed since 2010 and were not in liquidation. We evaluated the 
following criteria:
• Bankruptcy or restructuring: no bankruptcy or restructuring proposal/no problems = 1 
point, warning = 0.5 points, serious problems = 0 points;
• Enforced debt collection: no proceeding = 1 point, warning = 0.5 points, serious prob-
lems = 0 points;
• Debts on taxes or insurance: no debts registered = 1 point, warning = 0.5 points, serious 
problems = 0 points;
• Risk rate: average of the variables bankruptcy, enforced debt collection, debts on taxes or 
insurance;
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• Annual report format: annual report disclosed in a format enabling easy search of infor-
mation = 1 point, annual report disclosed in a 20 (1)(b) format not enabling easy search of 
information = 0 points;
• Information on corporate governance: annual report includes information on corporate 
governance = 1 point, annual report does not include information on corporate gover-
nance = 0 points;
• Reference to the code: annual report makes reference to the corporate governance code, 
evaluation within the interval < 0–1>, lower evaluation granted where the company made 
reference to invalid code or the title of the code was not indicated properly;
• The “comply or explain” principle: the company respects the “comply or explain” princi-
ple, evaluation within the interval < 0–1>, lower evaluation granted where this requirement 
was not respected sufficiently;
• Annual report evaluation: sum of variables Risk rate, Annual report format, Information 
on corporate governance, Reference to the code, The “comply or explain” principle.
For the purpose of quantitative analysis, we considered also the following variables:
• Profit or loss: profit (+) or loss (−) of a company in EUR;
• Assets: total value of company assets in EUR;
• Number of employees: coefficient was added according to the applicable interval: <1–2 > = 
1; <3–4 > = 2; <5–9 > = 3; <10–19 > = 4; <20–24 > = 5; <25–49 > = 6; <50–99 > = 7; <100–149 > = 
8; <150–199 > = 9; <200–249 > = 10; <250–499 > = 11; <500–999 > = 12; <1000–1999 > = 13; 
<2000–2999 > = 14; <3000–3999 > = 15;
• Profit or loss/number of employees: profit or loss of a company divided by the number of 
employees' coefficient;
• Assets/number of employees: total value of company assets divided by the number of 
employees’ coefficient.
Data were obtained from publicly available databases [20–23] and official companies’ web-
sites. Table 1 comprises the descriptive statistics of our survey.
The average profit of the evaluated corporations was approaching 21 million EUR and the 
average assets value was at 1.2 billion EUR. The average score of the annual report evaluation 
reached 2.59 points out of maximum 5 points. It is important to pay attention to the skewness 
according to which most of variables were negatively skewed. It means that the value of vari-
ables for the majority of corporations is lower than the mean. Negative skewness value can 
be observed for the variables of number of employees, annual report evaluation as well as all 
variables compounded in the annual report evaluation variable (e.g., risk rate, annual report 
format, information on corporate governance, reference to the code, the “comply or explain” 
principle). We interpret this as an insufficient corporate governance implementation. In our 
opinion, the reason behind is the insufficiently developed Slovak capital market that does not 
motivate corporations to improve performance against the principles and increase transparency. 
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High value of skewness can be observed for both variables of profit or loss and total assets. It 
means that few observations with very high value of variables exist. The validity of the results 
of quantitative analysis is negatively influenced by this fact. Therefore, we decided to proceed 
with the graphical regression analysis and with the figure showing the number of observations 
(histogram).
Figure 1 illustrates polynomial regression between the annual report evaluation reflecting 
the level of the corporate governance implementation and the profit or loss of a corpora-
tion divided by the number of employees’ coefficient. We tested a hypothesis that the level 
of corporate governance principles implementation should have impact on corporation 
profitability.
Based on our results (correlation coefficient R = 0.1828 and p-value = 0.3614), we were not able 
to confirm the hypothesis. The main reason is the existence of extreme observations that were 
indicated also by the skewness results. Thus, we were not able to confirm the existence of 
relationship between a good implementation of corporate governance principles and the prof-
itability of corporations, even when not taking into account three corporations with extreme 
values of variables. Therefore, we interpreted values of isolated variables using a histogram. 
The histograms show the standard normal distribution of observations. The majority of cor-
porations under evaluation reached a relatively low value of the variable profit or loss/num-
ber of employees (within the interval from 0 to 2,000,000 EUR) and higher value of the annual 
report evaluation. The three corporations with extreme values of variables reached high val-
ues for both variables (e.g., the profit or loss/number of employees and the annual report 
Variable Mean Standard Error Skewness Kurtosis Count
Profit or loss 20637480.33 46955078.05 2.67 6.56 27
Assets 1209156473.22 3068741581.81 3.14 9.22 27
Number of employees 9.22 3.66 −0.21 −0.4 27
Profit or loss/number of employees 1548612.31 3246777.11 2.67 6.92 27
Assets/number of employees 85789446.69 205263945.77 3.04 8.69 27
Bankruptcy 0.89 0.32 −2.62 5.27 27
Enforced debt collection 1.00 0.00 27
Debts on taxes or insurance 0.81 0.28 −1.25 0.74 27
Risk rate 0.90 0.16 −1.56 1.61 27
Annual report format 0.67 0.48 −0.75 −1.56 27
Information on corporate governance 0.74 0.45 −1.16 −0.70 27
Reference to the code 0.64 0.45 −0.65 −1.52 27
The “comply or explain” principle 0.54 0.47 −0.12 −1.99 27
Annual report evaluation 2.59 1.38 −0.67 −0.80 27
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the survey on Slovak corporations.
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evaluation). At the same time, no corporation with a high level of the profit or loss/number of 
employees' variable had a low value for the annual report evaluation variable. Therefore, we 
assume that larger corporations pay more attention to corporate governance implementation.
Results of the polynomial regression between the variables assets/number of employees and 
annual report evaluation as well as of the analysis of the two variables based on histogram 
(Figure 2) are very similar. We identified only two corporations with extreme values of vari-
ables. These extreme observations reduced both the correlation coefficient and the p-value and 
negatively influenced the validity of the results of quantitative analyses. The hypothesis that 
the level of corporate governance principles implementation should have impact on assets 
value was not confirmed for Slovak corporations. However, we have to add that, in the lit-
erature on corporate governance, a strong and significant positive relationship between good 
corporate governance (such as higher investor protection and lower managerial entrench-
ment) and firm value (measured by the Tobin's Q Ratio calculated as the market value of a 
Figure 1. Scatterplot with histograms of profit or loss/number of employees against annual report evaluation.
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company divided by the replacement value of the firm's assets) was shown within the context 
of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region [24].
5. Conclusion
After the long period of centrally planned economy, Slovakia changed its economic system and 
started to establish a market economy. State-owned property was privatized and private prop-
erty, as a prerequisite for the corporate governance implementation, was established. Despite 
efforts to implement a model of corporate governance based on financing by capital markets, 
a model based on credit financing was pushed through. The situation persists, and the Slovak 
capital market is still underdeveloped. Our aim was to evaluate the level of implementation of 
corporate governance in Slovakia after more than 25 years since starting the transition from a 
Figure 2. Scatterplot with histograms of assets/number of employees against annual report evaluation.
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centrally planned to a market economy, including a legal framework for its implementation as 
well as to explore the relationship between the level of the corporate governance implementation 
and economic results of corporations. We evaluated the level of corporate governance implemen-
tation on the basis of publicly available databases, annual reports, annual financial reports, and 
companies' websites. Our evaluation shows insufficient corporate governance implementation 
by corporation listed at the Bratislava Stock Exchange. Further, we were not able to confirm our 
hypothesis that good corporate governance has positive impact on corporation profitability and 
assets value. There was no observable statistical correlation between the economic performance 
of corporations and the level of corporate governance implementation. We interpret our results 
by an assertion that in Slovak conditions, benefits of the corporate governance implementation 
need not directly and immediately manifest themselves in increased profits or increased value of 
assets. However, it should be borne in mind that a correlation between adherence to corporate 
governance principles and economic performance may still exist but it was overridden by inef-
ficiency of underdeveloped Slovak capital market. It could be worthwhile to test the hypothesis 
in conditions of efficient markets. Nevertheless, we assume that larger corporations pay more 
attention to corporate governance implementation.
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